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In sickness but not in wealth: 
Field evidence on patients’ risk preferences in the financial and health domain 
 
Abstract: We present results from a hypothetical framed field experiment assessing whether 
risk preferences significantly differ across the health and financial domains when they are 
elicited through the same multiple price list paired-lottery method. We consider a sample of 
300 patients attending outpatient clinics in a university hospital in Athens, during the Greek 
financial crisis. Risk preferences in finance are elicited using paired-lottery questions with 
hypothetical payments. The questions are adapted to the health domain by framing the 
lotteries as risky treatments in hypothetical healthcare scenarios. Using Maximum 
Likelihood methods, we estimate the degree of risk aversion, allowing for the estimates to 
be dependent on domain and individual characteristics. The subjects in our sample, who 
were exposed to both health and financial distress, tend to be less risk averse in the financial 
than in the health domain.  
 
Key words: Behavioral experiments in health; Field experiments; Risk aversion. 
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Introduction 
We report the results from a hypothetical framed field experiment in the sense of Harrison 
and List (1) (that is, an experiment with non-student subjects making decisions in a field 
context) with 300 patients attending outpatient clinics in a Greek hospital during the current 
economic crisis. We elicit their risk preferences within both financial and health domains 
using the multiple price list (MPL) paired-lottery method of Holt and Laury (2) with 
hypothetical payments, and we test the hypothesis that risk preferences differ across 
domains.  
 
This research is motivated by the need to test different methods of measuring risk 
preferences in health. Despite previous attempts (3,4), there is currently no ‘gold standard’ 
metric for risk preferences in health. In addition, the evidence on how risk preferences 
correlate across the health and financial domains is scant. Very few risk preference measures 
have been tested in healthcare settings with real patients. 
  
Testing different measures of risk preferences in health and across domains is of key interest 
for research and policy purposes for three main reasons. First, it may allow a better 
understanding of how patients make healthcare decisions and adhere to them. Second, it may 
contribute to the validity of cost-effectiveness analysis and decision-making models where 
risk preferences are considered. Third, direct evidence on the tradeoff of risks across wealth 
and health sheds light on the willingness to enroll in voluntary health insurance. 
 
In this study we explore the possibility of measuring risk preferences in finance and health 
using the MPL method. Together with the Binswanger (5,6) and the Gneezy and Potters (7) 
methods, the Holt and Laury (2) MPL method is one of the most widely used incentive-
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compatible methods to measure risk preferences over monetary outcomes. In this method 
subjects are asked to choose the option they prefer in a series of pairs of lotteries involving 
different risk-outcome tradeoffs. We use the Holt and Laury (2) MPL test with hypothetical, 
rather than incentive-compatible, rewards, and calculate risk preferences in finance and 
health within subjects. 
 
We do so by considering subjects attending outpatient clinics in a hospital in Greece during 
the current economic recession. Such subjects find themselves within a ‘naturally occurring’ 
state of both financial and health distress. This context improves the likelihood of 
respondents perceiving the risky trade-offs as realistic and vivid even in the absence of 
actual incentive-compatible consequences for their responses. To the best of our knowledge, 
ours is the first study to elicit the risk preferences of a relatively large pool of subjects (n = 
300) in both the financial and the health domain using the same MPL paired-lottery 
measure.  
 
Our main finding is that risk preferences differ across the health and the financial domains 
even when they are elicited through the same MPL measure: our sample of Greek patients 
manifested higher risk aversion in health.  
 
Background: measuring risk preferences in health and across domains. 
The issue of whether preferences are stable is a central question among economists, 
psychologists, and ‘applied behavioral scientists’ (in the sense of Kahneman (8)). Preference 
stability tends to be assessed at two levels: over time, and across different domains in life at 
a given point in time.1 Our research relates to the latter. There are six main approaches to 
                                                 
1 Economists often distinguish between unconditional and conditional stability of risk preferences (9). 
Unconditional stability postulates that risk aversion literally remains constant over time. According to 
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measure risk preferences in health. The first approach uses insurance market choices (INS) 
to infer underlying risk preferences (16–18). Few recent articles have looked at choices 
across different insurance contracts to assess risk preferences across different life domains 
(19,20). 
 
A second approach uses ‘risky’ health behavior such as smoking, heavy drinking, or not 
using seat belts as indirect proxies for risk preferences. In this behavior-proxy (BP) strategy, 
which has been widely used (21–23), risk preferences are indirectly inferred from observed 
behavior rather than being directly measured. A third approach assumes that risk taking is 
inherently domain-specific, and should therefore be measured by domain-specific 
questionnaires (DS) such as the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking scale (DOSPERT), the Risk 
Propensity Questionnaire, and the Risk Propensity Scale (24–26). Although DS measures 
may be constructed to address health behaviors (27,28), a disadvantage of this approach is 
that risk preferences are not directly measured but are inferred from self-reported 
engagement in ‘risky’ behaviors. The fourth approach, a simplified variant of the third, is 
based on self-assessed willingness to take risk generally and in specific domains using 
Likert scales (29). This scale-based self-assessed (SB-SA) approach is simple and scores 
can be quantitatively compared across domains. However, the theoretical foundations of this 
‘direct scaling’ approach are unclear (3), and the evidence on how the SB-SA scores 
correlate with other risk preference measures and across different domains is mixed (29–31). 
Two common features of approaches two, three and four are that i) they are not incentive-
compatible, in the sense that the measures are merely hypothetical and they bear no real 
                                                                                                                                                      
conditional stability, however, what remains constant over time is the function that links the risk aversion with 
the observable states of nature. Conditional stability, a weaker concept of stability of preferences, is actually 
common among economists, who also refer to it as ‘state-dependent preferences’ (10,11). There are very few 
studies looking at the stability of preferences over time for representative samples of the population (e.g., 
Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (9) and Harrison and Lau (12) in Denmark). Other studies have 
typically looked at shorter time horizons (13), relatively small numbers of repeated observations (14) and/or 
very specific, not representative, pools of subjects (15). 
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consequences to subjects, and ii) they involve purely self-reported scale measures rather 
than explicit tradeoffs.  
 
The fifth approach encompasses a family of methods that measure risk preferences in health 
with tasks involving explicit trade-offs, rather than self-reported scales.2 Within this trade-
off approach a common method is the certainty equivalent (CE) method (3)(4,32). Of direct 
interest here, Prosser and Wittenberg (4) elicit CE in both health and money lotteries for 
multiple sclerosis patients and members of the general public. The proxy for risk preferences 
is the value of the CE, defined as the smallest amount of dollars or relapse-free days the 
respondent would be willing to accept instead of the lottery presented. Both groups of 
respondents were significantly risk averse for small and large monetary outcomes, but risk 
neutral with respect to health outcomes. Similar results were obtained by Warshawsky-
Livne et al. (33). CE questions have also been included in surveys such as the US Health and 
Retirement Survey, with mixed evidence on their links with other risk preference measures 
and with risky health behaviors (34,35). Other methods within this trade-off approach are 
the probability equivalent (PE) method, which is also at the heart of the standard gamble 
(SG) method commonly used to measure utilities of health states, and the gamble tradeoff 
(GTO) method (3,36). 
 
The final approach to measure risk preferences in health uses incentive-compatible (IC) tests 
involving real rewards to respondents. Similarly to what found in other areas, experimental 
economists have documented a ‘hypothetical response bias’ in the elicitation of risk 
preferences, with hypothetical methods showing significantly less risk aversion than 
                                                 
2 A comprehensive methodological discussion of these various trade-off approaches to measure risk 
preferences can be found in Wakker and Deneffe (3). Here we only briefly review the key tradeoff approaches 
applied to risk preferences in health. Notice that all the trade-off methods mentioned here can be incentive-
compatible when applied in measuring risk preferences for monetary outcomes. 
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methods with real rewards (2,37–40). Since measuring risk preferences in health with real 
health consequences is challenging, most studies employing IC methods offer monetary 
rewards, rather than health rewards, and compare elicited risk preferences to health 
behaviors, again with mixed results (30,41–43). 
 
The three most common IC measurement procedures for risk preferences for monetary 
outcomes are the ones proposed by Binswanger (5,6), Gneezy and Potters (7), and Holt and 
Laury (2) (HL) (44). The HL method uses a multiple price list (MPL) design which presents 
a series of questions, each reproducing a choice between two lotteries (2,45). The HL MPL 
method fully accounts for an individual being risk averse, risk neutral, or risk seeking, 
whereas the other two IC methods cannot empirically distinguish between risk neutrality and 
risk seeking. A second major advantage is that the HL method allows the researcher to 
structurally estimate the underlying risk preferences. In particular, the behavioral 
econometrics approach by Harrison and Rutström (46) and Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and 
Rutström (47,48) uses Maximum Likelihood (ML) to estimate the risk aversion parameters 
assuming a range of Expected Utility Theory (EUT) and non-EUT models (see Online 
Appendix C). 
 
In Table 1, we summarize the key studies that compare risk preferences across different 
domains. We briefly report their design; the methods; whether the rewards were hypothetical 
or real; the compared domains; their samples and settings; and their main findings, in 
particular whether they found consistent risk preferences across different domains. Not only 
is there a broad range of methods used in the literature, but also the evidence of risk 
preference stability across domains is mixed. Most studies have used hypothetical rewards, 
and few used either IC tests or actual insurance choices. Among the hypothetical tests, the 
CE method is most common, while the HL MPL method prevails among the IC methods. 
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With the exception of Wakker and Deneffe (3) and Harrison, List and Towe (49), most 
studies use a within-subjects design, with a broad heterogeneity of domains across which 
risk preferences are compared. Results are difficult to compare due to the high heterogeneity 
of samples, methods, and study designs. However, there is general evidence that there are 
differences across domains and that these also emerge when real consequences are at stake, 
for the studies using either the MPL or the INS approaches.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
The approach undertaken in the present work aims to bridge the gap between the fifth and 
the sixth approaches. As with the sixth approach, we use the MPL method and structurally 
estimate the risk preferences across the domains. On the other hand, similarly to the fifth 
approach we consider only hypothetical rather than real rewards. This was mainly due to the 
ethical and logistical constraints from operating in our outpatient clinic settings as well as 
the intention to minimize confounders across the two domains. Our study is 
methodologically close to the approach by Riddel (50) who compares risk preferences 
across the financial and the environmental domains using the HL MPL method with 
hypothetical rewards.  
 
Methods 
Setting 
The study took place in the outpatient clinics in the Laiko General Hospital in Athens, 
Greece, where one of the authors (CS) had previous research contacts. Laiko is a University 
Hospital, located in the centre of Athens; one of the country’s largest general public 
hospitals, it covers the broader region of Attica. The study was approved by the Research 
Ethics Committee of Laiko Hospital on the 6th of August 2010 (protocol number ES 462). 
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The fieldwork started in September 2010 and was run in four rounds over a period of 
fourteen months.  
 
Although not expected when the study was designed, the period of the fourteen months of 
data collection was of intense economic and political distress for Greece. A series of severe 
austerity measures were taken earlier that year (April 2010) when the country’s deficit 
reached 12% of the GDP. In May 2010 the IMF and the EU agreed on the first bailout loan 
to Greece. In June 2011, the Greek parliament voted a new austerity bill, which included 
severe spending cuts and tax increases, while in October 2011 a second ‘bailout’ loan was 
agreed. The austerity measures were followed by a series of strikes, violent riots and 
political instability.3  
 
Thus, the economic crisis gradually deteriorated during the months of data collection. For 
instance, the unemployment rate was 13.4% in September 2010 and increased gradually to 
20.2% in October 2011 (51). Although a number of reforms were introduced in healthcare, 
free access to outpatient clinics was not affected during the months of data collection.4 
 
Design 
In the present study we opted for not using IC payment mechanisms for four main reasons. 
First, the idea of implementing IC outcomes related to risky choices in outpatient clinics 
encountered resistance from the hospital’s Ethics Committee. So, in order to secure ethical 
approval to the project, tests had to be hypothetical. Second, implementing real payments for 
the chosen lotteries within the financial domain, while making the outcomes within the 
                                                 
3 For a self-contained timeline of the Greek economic crisis during the period of data collection, also see 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/mar/09/greek-debt-crisis-timeline  
4 For a more specific discussion of the policy measures in the healthcare area during the economic crisis see 
Petmesidou et al. (52). 
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health domain only hypothetical, clearly implies the introduction of a confounding factor 
that would hinder the attribution of the observed differences in choices to the different 
domains (50). Third, from a methodological perspective, we aimed at road testing the 
extension of the HL MPL method in measuring risk preferences in domains other than 
money, and to contribute to bridging the gap between IC tests for risk preferences with 
money (the HL MPL approach) and hypothetical trade-off methods typically used to 
measure risk preferences in health (the above CE, PE, and GTO approaches). Finally, opting 
for hypothetical payments makes our results closely comparable with the previous findings 
by Wakker and Deneffe (3), Prosser and Wittenberg (4) and Dohmen et al. (29), who also 
looked at risk preferences in money and health by comparing hypothetical responses to 
GTO, CE, or SB-SA tests, respectively. 
 
Sampling 
So that the respondents would perceive the risky tradeoffs as realistic and vivid even in the 
absence of IC consequences for their responses, we approached a pool of subjects who 
found themselves within a ‘naturally occurring’ state of both financial and health distress, 
and presented them tests within a field context and with naturalistic stakes. 
 
Our sample consists of real patients attending outpatient clinics in a hospital in Greece 
during the current economic recession. We assume these subjects are naturally exposed at 
the same time to both finance- and health-related risk. The two sources of field risks are 
different in nature, at least according to the distinction between foreground and background 
risk discussed by Harrison, List, and Towe (49). Given the field setting where subjects were 
recruited, the health risk associated with visiting a hospital clinic can be considered a 
foreground risk, while the financial crisis is a background risk. 
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Furthermore, recruiting our sample in a clinical setting renders it more likely that subjects 
are apprehensive about the state of their health compared to the one of their finances. Thus 
in this sample subjects likely are more risk averse in health than in money, which would not 
hold in other contexts.  
 
We targeted a sample size of n=300 patients. We recruited patients from all outpatient 
clinics where patients were reasonably affected by health conditions characterized by only 
moderate pain or discomfort, anxiety or distress, according to the EQ-5D classification 
(53,54). When recruiting, we approached all patients while they were waiting to see their 
doctors in the outpatient clinics of the hospital, between 9 am and 1 pm. Research assistants 
simply mentioned that the questionnaire was a study conducted by a university. Interviews 
were conducted roughly equally across all working days of the week, and all morning hours. 
We reached the final target of n=300 patients by approaching 386 patients in total, 
corresponding to a response rate of 78 per cent. In order to reach the target sample, four 
different rounds of data collection were needed, in September 2010 (round 1, lasting 5 
weeks, n=91), January 2011 (round 2, lasting 4 weeks, n=34), April 2011 (round 3, lasting 5 
weeks, n=56) and October 2011 (round 4, lasting 4 weeks, n=119). 
 
Questionnaire 
Patients who agreed to participate were given a questionnaire which took approximately 20 
minutes to complete. Patients were given both verbal and written instructions. The research 
assistant sat next to them, clarifying issues regarding the experimental tests and making sure 
that respondents clearly understood the questions.  
 
The first part of the questionnaire assessed socio-demographic variables (e.g., age, sex, 
education, income brackets), individual life style and health habits (e.g., self-assessed health, 
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health behaviors), and psychological traits (e.g., overconfidence). In the second part of the 
experiment we elicited individual risk preferences.  
 
The questionnaire was developed in English and was linguistically validated in Greek 
following the guidelines on cross-cultural adaptation (55,56). It was first tested among 32 
patients from the same population (see Online Appendix B). The responses from this pilot 
were not included in the final analysis.  
 
Framework 
We assume that risk preferences are elicited within the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) 
framework for a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) individual (2,9,45,57): the utility 
function of a subject in the financial domain, in terms of monetary payoffs W, is thus 
w
r
r
W
WU
w
-
=
-
1
)(
1
                                                                      (1) 
 
where wr   is the coefficient of constant relative risk aversion in finance. Subjects’ risk 
aversion can be grouped in three main types: 
1. If  0=wr ,   risk neutral 
2. If 0>wr , >risk averse 
3. If 0<wr  , risk seeking 
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In a similar way, the utility of a subject within the health domain is defined in terms of days 
in full health H, and assumed to be 
H
r
r
H
HU
H
-
=
-
1
)(
1
 where Hr   is the coefficient of constant 
relative risk aversion in health.5 
 
Eliciting risk preferences 
We used the same MPL method (3) (2,45–48) to elicit risk preferences in both finance and 
health. Each subject was asked two sets of questions, first in finance (questions Q1.11 in the 
Online Appendix A), then in health (questions Q1.13 in the Online Appendix A). The pilot 
study, in fact, suggested that the lotteries were easier to understand if presented in finance 
first. Presenting the financial lotteries before the health ones makes the test directly 
comparable with the analogous design by Prosser and Wittenberg (4). Such a design feature 
of our study, however, does not allow us to explicitly account for possible order effects of 
responses across different domains (see the Online Appendix B). The questionnaire also 
included inter-temporal questions, which are not analyzed here. 
 
In each set of risk preference questions patients were asked to choose between two risky 
options (lotteries), A and B (Tables 2 and 3). In the 9 pairs of risky options in either set we 
varied both the probabilities pkj and the payoffs associated with each outcome k=1,2 of the 
two lotteries, either in monetary (Wkj) or in days in full health (Hkj) terms, with j=A,B. The 
probabilities varied from 0 to 100%, while the payoffs varied from €10 to €385 in the 
financial domain. Subjects could not manifest indifference between the two lotteries. 
                                                 
5 As an extension, we have also considered risk preferences within the Rank Dependent Utility (RDU) model 
by Quiggin (58). RDU is a generalization of EUT that allows subjects to transform the objective probabilities 
presented in lotteries and to use these weighted probabilities as decision weights in the evaluation of the 
lotteries. In particular, we have considered the ‘power’ probability weighting function w(p) proposed by 
Quiggin (58) which is defined over a unique ‘curvature’ parameter y: w(p)=py. When y≠1 the RDU model 
deviates from the EUT model: concavity and convexity of w(p) are said to reflect ‘optimism’ and ‘pessimism’, 
respectively, in how a subject perceives objective probabilities. The Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) 
from a two-prizes lottery in health, for instance, can be written as RDEU=[w(p(H1))*U(H1)]+[(1-
w(p(H1)))*U(H1)], where w(p)=py. In footnote 14 we briefly report the results obtained under RDU.    
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[Insert Tables 2 and 3 here] 
 
To elicit risk preferences in health, we framed the financial paired-lottery method in terms of 
health rewards, while keeping unaltered the structure and all other features of the MPL 
elicitation test in order to allow for comparability across domains. Therefore, the lotteries 
were presented as pairs of different healthcare treatments characterized by some risk. The 
healthcare context was chosen to ensure a vivid and realistic representation of the 
hypothetical alternatives by patients attending outpatient clinics, and is fully in line with the 
choice between two surgical procedures by Wakker and Deneffe (3) and two drugs by 
Prosser and Wittenberg (4). Participants were told that each treatment in the pair of options 
was expected to provide some amount of health benefits with some probability, and a lower 
amount of health benefits with the complementary probability. Analogously to the financial 
domain, one treatment (A) was presented as characterized by a smaller difference between 
health benefits than the risky treatment (lottery B), and the series of pairs of treatments only 
differ with respect to the probabilities of occurrence for the higher health benefits. 
Concerning the exact nature of health benefits, the natural candidate for the equivalent of an 
extra unit of money in the health domain was an extra unit of time in full health.6  
 
Importantly, by considering patients in hospital clinics, who were by definition not yet 
‘satiated’ in their level of time in full health, we ensured that a lottery in health providing an 
extra unit of time in full health was perceived as associated with a strictly positive benefit by 
all subjects. To emphasize this, we also made it clear that, once the effects of the health 
                                                 
6 This is consistent with the conceptual framework of cost-utility analysis (CUA) where health benefits are 
typically evaluated relative to the benchmark of a unit of time in full health, whose benefit in terms of utility is 
usually standardized to one. In the monetary domain, this closely corresponds to standardizing to one the utility 
of a unit of income/money. The choice of time in full health as the natural equivalent metric of money in the 
health domain is also in line with Wakker and Deneffe (3) and Prosser and Wittenberg (4). 
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treatments would end, subjects would go back to the health status they were initially 
experiencing. This is analogous to the stimuli used by Prosser and Wittenberg (4).  
 
Comparing the finance and health domains 
The implicit conversion rate between domains was of one euro per day in full health. The 
choice of the conversion rate was based on the evidence from the pilot experiment run with 
a sample of patients from the same hospital having similar characteristics to the respondents 
in our experiment. The assumption of the one-to-one conversion rate is key for the analysis 
(under both the EUT and the RDU models) as it impacts the cross-domain comparisons: a 
detailed discussion of the justification, methodological issues, and limitations associated 
with our conversion rate between domains can be found in Online Appendix B. 
 
Estimating risk preferences 
To estimate risk preferences we used Maximum Likelihood (ML) methods and followed the 
econometric approach of Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (45,47,48) and Harrison 
and Rutström (46), where the full details of the empirical strategy can be found.7 A self-
contained discussion of the approach can be found in Online Appendix C. We pooled all the 
observations and included a categorical variable (‘H’) to control for whether the responses 
refer to the money (H=0) or the health domain (H=1).8 As we collected 9 responses for each 
domain from 300 subjects, the resulting dataset comprised 5400 observations overall. We 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of observations within the same subject, 
by treating the residuals from the same individual as potentially correlated, and computing 
cluster-robust standard errors. In the model, the ‘r’ parameter is a function of the domain 
(‘H’), of the rounds of data collection, and of other observable individual characteristics. 
                                                 
7 An alternative approach has recently been proposed by Andersen, Harrison, Hole, Lau, and Rutström (59). 
8 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this approach. 
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Besides the estimated CRRA coefficient ‘r’, the ML estimations report a ‘noise’ (‘mu’) 
parameter which reflects the individual ‘errors’ in identifying the preferred lottery (as 
mentioned, indifference was excluded by design).  
 
Variables and descriptive statistics 
Table 4 presents the definition and main descriptive statistics of the variables included in the 
analysis. We use socio-demographic variables to control for respondents’ age (age), gender 
(female), marital status (married), levels of education (educ), self-assessed health (sah), and 
for whether or not they have children (children). We use two economic variables: one 
showing the monthly income bracket the respondent belongs to (income), and another 
indicating how constrained respondents feel by their current financial situation (finconstr).9 
As we pool all subjects, the variables round2, round3, and round4 control for the round 
when the questionnaire was collected, with the reference being round 1: 91 patients were 
interviewed in round 1 of data collection, 34 patients in round 2, 56 in round 3, and, finally, 
119 in round 4.  The categorical variable H represents the domain in which the responses to 
questions on risk preferences are elicited. The main question is whether the domain variable 
H is statistically significant.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Results 
 
We first present the coefficient of risk aversion structurally estimated using all the data 
pooled across both domains (Model 1, Table 5). The estimated CRRA coefficient is 
                                                 
9 The correlation between income and finconstr is negative and highly significant (p=0.000) for the whole 
sample (-0.2026) as well as for each round of data collection (-0.2234, -0.3488, -0.3574, and -0.2905 in rounds 
1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively). 
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r=0.0643 (95% Confidence Interval, CI: -0.0273 to 0.1560), not significantly different from 
risk neutrality. The fact that subjects exhibit overall risk neutral preferences is broadly 
consistent with the view that the use of hypothetical elicitation methods can favour the 
observation of risk neutral over risk averse responses (2,37–40,60).  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
When looking at the differences across domains, we find that our sample exhibits significant 
risk averse responses in the health domain: while the overall estimated coefficient of risk 
aversion is not statistically different from zero (p=0.169), the estimated coefficient for the 
health domain variable is 0.133 (95% CI: 0.0212 to 0.2455) and statistically significantly 
different from zero (p=0.020), corresponding to a moderate degree of risk aversion (Model 
2, Table 5).10 
 
When we pool all data across both domains and control for the rounds of data collection 
(n=91 in round 1; n=34 in round 2; n=56 in round 3; n=119 in round 4), we find evidence of 
progressively more risk seeking responses in Models 3-5, (Table 5) but not in Model 7, 
which also controls for finconstr (see below): responses are significantly more  risk seeking 
in rounds 2, 3, and 4 compared to the first round of data collection. Risk preferences in the 
health domain remain statistically significantly more risk averse than in the finance domain 
                                                 
10 As mentioned in footnote 5, we have also estimated subjects’ risk preferences under the RDU model using 
the ‘power’ probability weighting function proposed by Quiggin (58). The RDU estimations qualify the 
findings obtained for the EUT and allow us to ‘structurally decompose’ the part of the risk premium due to 
aversion to outcome variability (the ‘r’ parameter) and the part due to probability weighting (the ‘y’ 
coefficient) (12).  First, the estimates of the ‘y’ coefficient (y=1.6338, with robust standard errors of 0.1249, 
p=0.000) suggest that for subjects in our sample, the RDU model seems to be favored in comparison to EUT 
(under which y should not be significantly different from 1). Second, under RDU subjects appear generally 
characterized by a more concave curvature of the utility function than under EUT (r=0.3695, with standard 
errors of 0.0868, p=0.000). Third, and in line with the risk preferences patterns described above for EUT, the 
estimates of the health domain effect on the ‘r’ coefficient indicate that patients in our sample are characterized 
by significantly more concave utility functions in health than in finance (H=0.1983, with standard errors of 
0.0912, p=0.030). Finally, the estimates of the health domain effect on the ‘y’ coefficient of the ‘power’ 
function show that the probability weighting function is not statistically different across the two domains 
(0.1637, with standard errors of 0.1417, p=0.248). 
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(Models 4-5, Table 5). As shown by the lack of statistical significance of the interaction 
terms (except for a significant effect of round 3, n=56), the cross-domain difference in risk 
preferences does not vary according to the degree of exogenous financial risk, while the 
effects of the rounds of data collection are still significant (Model 5, Table 5).11 
 
Controlling for a range of socio-demographic variables shows no statistically significant 
association of the overall estimated risk aversion with observable characteristics except for 
the variable finconstr that is statistically significantly associated with more risk seeking 
responses (Model 6, Table 5).12. The introduction of interaction terms between the rounds 
and the financial constraint status shows that the subjects who, in round 4, felt more 
uncomfortable with their financial situations reported more risk-seeking responses (Model 7, 
Table 5).13 
 
Discussion 
The result that respondents in our pool were relatively more risk averse in health than 
financial matters is in line with Wakker and Deneffe (3), who found more risk aversion in 
                                                 
11 The same pattern of risk preferences at different rounds of data collection emerges when looking at the raw 
responses of subjects in terms of ‘switching points’ between lottery A to lottery B in the two sets of questions. 
In the MPL tests, in fact, the later the respondents switch to lottery B, the more risk averse they are. Notice 
that, in contrast with what is often documented in lab experiments, in our sample virtually no subject switched 
more than once across lotteries in each block of questions. This was mainly due to the fact that, in our 
experiment, research assistants sat next to the patients, and were trained to provide clear instructions and 
guidance to respondents. The raw responses of subjects interviewed in later rounds of data collection exhibited 
less risk aversion in both the finance and the health domains. In finance, the average switching point was 
5.7011, 5.1176, 4.6786, and 4.3675 in rounds 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. In health, the average switching point 
was 6.4934, 4.9687, 4.5647, and 4.2454 in rounds 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. The correlation between the 
switching points across domains is positive and significant (p=0.000) for the whole sample (0.5136) as well as 
for each round of data collection (0.2905, 0.2287, 0.6529, and 0.7562 in rounds 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively). 
Moreover, subjects self-reported higher degree of financial distress in later rounds of data collection: the 
average value of finconstr was 2.1428 in round 1, 2.3333 in round 2, 2.4347 in round 3, and 2.8271 in round 4. 
12 We have also estimated many alternative models and found, for instance, that in our sample the estimated 
EUT CRRA coefficient of risk aversion is not statistically significantly associated to a range of health 
behaviors such as smoking (p=0.182), drinking (p=0.159), physical exercise (p=0.983), having chronic 
conditions (0.149), and of psychological attitudes such as ‘illusion of control’ (p=0.285) or ‘better-than-
average’ overconfidence (p=0.426). 
13 When interpreting these results, it is worthwhile to recall that the finconstr variable captures self-reported 
feelings of being constrained by the financial situation.  
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health in their between-subjects study. Our findings are also qualitatively in line with those 
of Blais and Weber (24) using the DOSPERT test, and with the Dohmen et al. (29) finding 
that SOEP respondents reported higher willingness to take risk in finance than in health.  
 
Our findings are the opposite of what found by Prosser and Wittenberg (4): patients in their 
sample were risk neutral in health, while significantly risk averse in finance. Besides 
obvious differences in the subject pools, as well as in the methods used to measure risk 
preferences, the different patterns in cross-domain risk attitudes could be due to the fact that 
our respondents were simultaneously exposed to both financial and health distress. 
 
Both raw responses and estimated risk aversion parameters show that respondents were 
more likely to seek risk if they were interviewed at later rounds of the study, when the 
recession worsened. This is generally in line with observations of the spread of risky 
behaviors among the Greeks during the economic recession (61,62).  
 
Our findings are the opposite of what is documented as counter-cyclical risk aversion (i.e., 
people taking more risks when the economy is growing): Cohn, Engelmann, Fehr, and 
Marechal (63) found that Swiss financial professionals primed to a fictive chart of a 
booming stock market took higher risk in an incentive-compatible assessment of risk 
preferences than subjects primed to a busting market. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (64) 
found similar results in hypothetical risk preference questions to customers of an Italian 
bank before and after the 2008 crisis.  
 
 
Conclusions 
20 
 
Our goal was to elicit risk preferences in the financial and health domains using the same 
MPL paired-lottery method. We considered a sample of Greek patients in the middle of an 
economic recession and we found evidence that risk preferences may differ between the 
health and the financial domains even when they are measured using the same MPL method. 
When exposed to both financial and health distress, our sample of Greek patients tends to be 
more risk averse in health than in finance. 
 
From a methodological perspective, conducting the same MPL test with subjects in 
naturally occurring field situations of both financial and health distress can contribute to 
bring closer together two streams of methods which have proceeded along distinct paths: on 
the one hand, incentive-compatible (IC) experimental measures for risk preferences with real 
monetary stakes, and on the other, hypothetical tests in the health domain. Despite its key 
importance for both research and policy purposes, there is still no current ‘gold standard’ to 
measure risk preferences in health, nor to compare them across different domains 
(4,26,27,65). Our review section is an attempt to bring closer together the different 
approaches and methods in this area. 
 
The study has several limitations. In Online Appendix B, we extensively discuss some of the 
limitations of our design which include: sample selection due to recruiting patients in out-
patient clinics; key assumptions on the EUT, the CRRA, the specific levels of the stakes, 
and the implicit conversion rate between one euro and one day in full health; possible order 
effects of asking subjects risk preferences questions in finance first; and unknown 
interactions between the foreground and background risks as perceived by the subjects. 
 
Furthermore, due to the constraints related to approaching patients in hospital clinics, we 
asked respondents to make hypothetical choices. There is evidence that responses to 
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hypothetical questions exhibit less risk aversion compared to IC methods (2,37–40,60,66–
68). A different experimental design (e.g. Blackburn, Harrison, and Rutström (66)) would 
permit assessment of the extent of the above hypothetical bias, and recalibration of 
responses for this. More generally, the design and implementation of IC measures of risk 
preferences in the health domain is a challenging but promising area, and we envisage 
further research in more controlled experimental settings. An interesting question is related 
to whether the ‘disciplinary power’ of IC tests is sufficiently strong to align responses on 
risk preferences across the two domains. 
 
Notwithstanding these limitations our findings have significant implications. Our results 
imply caution in using measures for risk aversion elicited in financial contexts to infer risk 
preferences in health domains. More studies on the validity of existing methodologies in 
assessing risk preferences across domains should be welcome. Another research area that 
warrants further investigation is whether within-subject risk preferences are stable across 
different health-related contexts, such as preventive care or medical treatments, for instance. 
 
The implications of our findings are not only of academic interest. The development of 
different metrics to measure risk preferences in health and to compare them with their 
monetary analogues can prove useful to enrich the validity of the cost-effectiveness analyses 
and decision-making models in which they are incorporated (69). More generally, accessing 
evidence on how risks are traded off across wealth and health helps in assessing the 
likelihood that people enroll in voluntary health insurance schemes, and in estimating the 
willingness to pay for them. This is a key concern as private insurance schemes will become 
increasingly important to increase the benefits of publicly-funded universal healthcare 
coverage. Our results also provide useful insights for the design of policy interventions that 
affect decisions and behaviors spanning simultaneously across the financial and health 
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domain, such as the design of financial incentive schemes to tackle health risky behaviors 
(70–73). 
 
Finally, a deeper understanding of risk preferences in health allows a better exploration of 
how patients make healthcare decisions, such as adhering to medical decisions and seeking a 
second medical opinion (74,75). In such decisions a key role is typically played by the 
doctors whose risk preferences may be similar to, or different from, the patients’, in a 
similar way to what previously documented in other contexts (76). The exploration of this 
distinct question is left for further work (77). 
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Table 2: Payoff matrix in the HL MPL experimental test in the financial domain 
P
ai
r 
Lottery A Lottery B EVA EVB EVA-EVB CRRA range if 
subject 
switches from 
lottery A to 
lottery B at 
that pair 
 P1 €1 P2 €2 P1 €1 P2 €2 € € €  
1 10% 200 90% 160 10% 385 90% 10 164 47.5 116.55 -∞; -1.71 
2 20% 200 80% 160 20% 385 80% 10 168 85.0 83.0 -1.71; -0.95 
3 30% 200 70% 160 30% 385 70% 10 172 122.5 49.5 -0.95; -0.49 
4 40% 200 60% 160 40% 385 60% 10 176 160.0 16.0 -0.49; -0.15 
5 50% 200 50% 160 50% 385 50% 10 180 197.5 -17.5 -0.15; 0.14 
6 60% 200 40% 160 60% 385 40% 10 184 235.0 -51.0 0.14; 0.41 
7 70% 200 30% 160 70% 385 30% 10 188 272.5 -84.5 0.41; 0.68 
8 80% 200 20% 160 80% 385 20% 10 192 310.0 -118.0 0.68; 0.97 
9 90% 200 10% 160 90% 385 10% 10 196 347.5 -151.5 0.97; 1.37 
Notes.  
HL: Holt & Laury method; MPL: Multiple Price List method; EV: Expected Value; CRRA: Constant Relative 
Risk Aversion. 
The columns with the expected values for the lotteries and the implied CRRA ranges were not shown to the 
subjects in the field experiment. The implied CRRA ranges presume that, for every gamble before the 
switching pair, lottery A is preferred, and, for every gamble after the switching pair, lottery B is preferred. 
The specific instructions for this item are reported in Question Q.1.11 in Online Appendix A. 
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Table 3: The set of choices between binary lotteries given to the patients in the health 
domain. 
ID Treatment A Treatment B Your Choice 
 P Days 
in full 
health 
P Days 
in full 
health 
P Days 
in full 
health 
P Days 
in full 
health 
A B 
1 10% 200 90% 160 10% 385 90% 10 A B 
2 20% 200 80% 160 20% 385 80% 10 A B 
3 30% 200 70% 160 30% 385 70% 10 A B 
4 40% 200 60% 160 40% 385 60% 10 A B 
5 50% 200 50% 160 50% 385 50% 10 A B 
6 60% 200 40% 160 60% 385 40% 10 A B 
7 70% 200 30% 160 70% 385 30% 10 A B 
8 80% 200 20% 160 80% 385 20% 10 A B 
9 90% 200 10% 160 90% 385 10% 10 A B 
Note.  
The specific instructions for this item are reported in Question Q.1.13 in Online Appendix A. 
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Table 4: Description of variables 
         
Variable Variable description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Age Age in years 39.62 12.91 18 74 
Female Female (0=no, 1=yes) 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Educ Level of education 5.59 1.63 1 8 
Income 
Income level (1= less than €600 …5=more than 
€2,000) 2.58 1.06 1 5 
Finconstr 
Feeling constrained by financial state (1=living 
comfortably…4=find it very difficult) 2.46 0.75 1 4 
Married Married (0=no, 1=yes) 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Children Having children (0=no, 1=yes) 0.34 0.47 0 1 
SAH Self-assessed health (1= very good…5=very bad) 2.40 1.16 1 5 
Round2, 
Round3, 
Round4 Variables for rounds 2, 3, and 4 of data collection     0 1 
H Variable for responses in health domain   0 1 
Extra variables used in robustness estimations (results briefly reported in note 16) 
(Chronic) Chronic condition (0=no, 1=yes) 0.17 0.38 0 1 
(Smoker) Smoking daily or occassionally (0=no, 1=yes) 0.37 0.48 0 1 
(Alcohol) More than one alcohol unit per week (0=no, 1=yes) 0.65 0.48 0 1 
(Exercise) Number of hours of vigorous exercise per week  2.76 4.38 0 50 
(BTA) Better than average index 59.44 33.43 -72 100 
(IoC) Illusion of control index 61.29 12.80 18.75 100 
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Table 5: Structural estimates of CRRA parameters 
    
 R model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6 model 7 
H  0.1333**  0.1461** 0.284**   
  (0.0572)  (0.0621) (0.117)   
Round2   -0.38*** -0.38*** -0.268**  -0.6308* 
   (0.106) (0.106) (0.132)  (0.3638) 
Round3   -0.57*** -0.58*** -0.425***  -0.0252 
   (0.131) (0.132) (0.158)  (0.3856) 
Round4   -0.59*** -0.60*** -0.499***  0.1895 
   (0.115) (0.115) (0.143)  (0.3542) 
H*R2     -0.227   
     (0.188)   
H*R3     -0.294**   
      (0.149)   
H*R4     -0.203   
     (0.151)   
Age        0.0033  
        (0.0055)  
Female        -0.0416  
        (0.0990)  
Educ        -0.0337  
        (0.0362)  
Married        0.1689  
        (0.1365)  
Children        -0.1461  
        (0.1522)  
SAH        -0.0140  
        (0.0599)  
Income        -0.0846  
        (0.0514)  
Finconstr       -0.163** 0.1193 
       (0.0684) (0.0919) 
FinC*R2          0.1372 
       (0.1511) 
FinC*R3       -0.2583 
       (0.1609) 
FinC*R4       -0.2896** 
       (0.1419) 
Constant 0.0643 -0.0029 0.433*** 0.361*** 0.293*** 0.776** 0.138 
 (0.0467) (0.0570) (0.0808) (0.0867) (0.101) (0.366) (0.217) 
Noise ( )               
 0.295*** 0.294*** 0.283*** 0.283*** 0.283*** 0.263*** 0.255*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Obs. 5400 5400 5400 5400 5400 4122 4176 
Notes. 
Standard errors in parentheses: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
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H: health domain responses. 
SAH: self-assessed health. 
Finconstr: self-reported feeling of being constrained by financial situation. 
H*R2, H*R3, H*R4: interaction terms between H and rounds 2, 3, and 4 respectively. 
FinC*R2, FinC*R3, FinC*R4: interaction terms between Finconstr and rounds 2, 3, and 4 respectively.  
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Online Appendix A – Questionnaires both in English and Greek 
Dear Madam/Sir 
 
We would like to invite you to participate in a study asking your personal views on 
health and life in general. The survey consists of two parts. The first part takes place 
while waiting to see your doctor and takes 15 minutes to complete. The second part will 
be completed after you see your doctor and takes 5 minutes to answer. 
 
The study is conducted strictly for academic purposes and neither the Hospital nor the 
doctor have any involvement in it. All answers will remain completely anonymous and 
confidential.  
 
We appreciate your time and effort. 
 
Kind regards, 
The Research Team  
 
 
Q1.01 How is your health in general? Would you say it is… (please circle the appropriate 
box) 
 
Very 
Good 
Good Fair Bad Very bad (NA) 
 
 
Q1.02 Are you hampered in your daily activities in any way by any longstanding illness, or 
disability, infirmity or mental health problem? If yes, is that a lot or to some extent? (please 
circle the appropriate box) 
 
Yes, a lot Yes, to some 
extent 
No (NA) 
 
Q1.03 Do you smoke or did you ever smoke? (please circle the appropriate box) 
 
Smoke 
daily 
Smoke 
occasionally  
Do not smoke, 
used to smoke 
daily 
Do not smoke, 
used to smoke 
occasionally 
Never 
smoked 
(NA) 
 
 
Q1.04 If you smoke, how many cigarettes do you smoke on average a day?  
 (please indicate number of cigarettes in the box) 
 
 
Q1.05 How many units of alcohol do you drink a week? (a unit of alcohol corresponds to a 
small glass of wine, a medium glass of beer or a shot of 
spirits). 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
Q1.06 How many hours a week do you usually spend in moderate physical activities? 
Consider as a physical activity any moderate physical activity lasting for at least 40 
consecutive minutes (such as walking, cleaning, gardening). 
 
Q1.07 How many hours a week do you usually spend in vigorous physical activities? 
Consider as a physical activity any vigorous physical activity lasting for at least 40 
consecutive minutes (such as cycling, jogging, gym, step aerobics, swimming, 
football etc). 
 
 
Q1.08 Please indicate whether each of the following statements applies or not to your 
behaviour: (please tick the appropriate column) 
 Totally 
agree Agree 
It 
depends 
Do not 
agree 
Completely 
disagree 
a. I never make up a decision I will 
regret in the future 
     
b. I can never identify which 
choice is better for me 
     
c. Life is like a lottery. Being 
happy is just a matter of chance 
     
d. My forecasts are always correct 
     
 
 
Q1.09 Provide a percentage to answer each of the following questions: 
 Percentage 
(%) 
a. What percentage of people of your age have a better job than you,  
because they have better skills than you 
 
b. What percentage of your neighbours will better succeed in life when 
compared to you because of their better qualities with respect to yours 
 
c. What percentage of people of your age will have higher cash 
payments than yours for their better performance in their jobs?  
 
 
 
Q1.10 How I see myself (tick the appropriate column): 
 Strongly 
agree Agree 
Not 
sure 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
a. I am a daring person who generally 
takes risks.      
b. I take initiative, pursuing opportunities 
even when they involve some risk.      
c. I am a cautious person who generally 
avoids risks. 
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d. I always play it safe even if it means 
occasionally losing out on a good 
opportunity. 
     
 
 
 
Q1.11. Please, for each of the following rows, each containing a pair of alternative 
hypothetical lotteries, choose the lottery that you prefer between option A and option B. 
Lottery A will give you either 200 € or 160 € with some probabilities which change 
gradually in each row. Lottery B will give you either 385 € or 10 € again with some 
probabilities that change gradually in each row.  
 
For instance, in row 1, lottery A gives you 200 € with probability 10% and 160 € with 
probability 90%, while lottery B gives you 385 € with probability 10% and 10 € with 
probability 90%. Please, make your choice for each row/pair, by putting a circle around 
either A or B in the last columns. Remember there are no right or wrong answers. It’s your 
personal choices we are interested in.  
 
ID Lottery A Lottery B Your Choice 
 P € P € p € P € A B 
1 10% 200 90% 160 10% 385 90% 10 A B 
2 20% 200 80% 160 20% 385 80% 10 A B 
3 30% 200 70% 160 30% 385 70% 10 A B 
4 40% 200 60% 160 40% 385 60% 10 A B 
5 50% 200 50% 160 50% 385 50% 10 A B 
6 60% 200 40% 160 60% 385 40% 10 A B 
7 70% 200 30% 160 70% 385 30% 10 A B 
8 80% 200 20% 160 80% 385 20% 10 A B 
9 90% 200 10% 160 90% 385 10% 10 A B 
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Q1.12 Please, for each of the following rows, each containing a pair of alternative 
hypothetical options, choose the one that you prefer between option A and option B. Both 
options give you certain monetary payments. Payments in option A will be given at a later 
date, and payments in option B are given today. Please, make your choice for each row/pair, 
by putting a circle around either A or B in the last columns. Remember there are no right or 
wrong answers. It’s your personal choices we are interested in. 
 
 
ID Option A                  Option B Your choice 
1 Receive 360 € in 1 week Receive 60 € today A B 
2 Receive 360 € in 1 week Receive 120 € today A B 
3 Receive 360 € in 1 week Receive 180 € today A B 
4 Receive 360 € in 1 week Receive 240 € today A B 
5 Receive 360 € in 1 week Receive 300 € today A B 
     
6 Receive 360 € in 1 month Receive 60 € today A B 
7 Receive 360 € in 1 month Receive 120 € today A B 
8 Receive 360 € in 1 month Receive 180 € today A B 
9 Receive 360 € in 1 month Receive 240 € today A B 
10 Receive 360 € in 1 month Receive 300 € today A B 
     
11 Receive 360 € in 3 months Receive 60 € today A B 
12 Receive 360 € in 3 months Receive 120 € today A B 
13 Receive 360 € in 3 months Receive 180 € today A B 
14 Receive 360 € in 3 months Receive 240 € today A B 
15 Receive 360 € in 3 months Receive 300 € today A B 
     
16 Receive 900 € in 1 week Receive 150 € today A B 
17 Receive 900 € in 1 week Receive 300 € today A B 
18 Receive 900 € in 1 week Receive 450 € today A B 
19 Receive 900 € in 1 week Receive 600 € today A B 
20 Receive 900 € in 1 week Receive 750 € today A B 
     
21 Receive 900 € in 1 month Receive 150 € today A B 
22 Receive 900 € in 1 month Receive 300 € today A B 
23 Receive 900 € in 1 month Receive 450 € today A B 
24 Receive 900 € in 1 month Receive 600 € today A B 
25 Receive 900 € in 1 month Receive 750 € today A B 
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26 Receive 900 € in 3 months Receive 150 € today A B 
27 Receive 900 € in 3 months Receive 300 € today A B 
28 Receive 900 € in 3 months Receive 450 € today A B 
29 Receive 900 € in 3 months Receive 600 € today A B 
30 Receive 900 € in 3 months Receive 750 € today A B 
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Q1.13. Please think of the following hypothetical scenarios. Suppose you need to choose 
between two medical treatments, A and B. Each treatment has two possible outcomes in 
terms of how long the effect will last. You know the probabilities with which this will 
happen. Irrespective of which treatment you choose, for as long as their effect lasts you are 
in full health. When the effect of the treatment is gone, you go back to your initial state 
of health, i.e. the state you where before you started the treatment that is the same 
regardless of the treatment you chose, and no further treatment will be allowed. 
 
For instance, in row 1, treatment A will give you 200 days of full health with probability 
10% or 160 days in full health with probability 90%. Treatment B gives you 385 days of full 
health with probability 10% or 10 days in full health with probability 90%.  
 
Please, make your choice for each row/pair, by putting a circle around either A or B in the 
last columns. Remember there are no right or wrong answers. It’s your personal choices we 
are interested in. 
 
 Treatment A Treatment B Your 
Choice 
 P Days in full 
health 
P Days in full 
health 
P Days in full 
health 
P Days in 
full health 
  
1 10% 200 days 90% 160 days  10% 385 days  90% 10 days A B 
2 20% 200 days  80% 160 days  20% 385 days  80% 10 days A B 
3 30% 200 days  70% 160 days  30% 385 days  70% 10 days A B 
4 40% 200 days  60% 160 days  40% 385 days  60% 10 days A B 
5 50% 200 days  50% 160 days  50% 385 days  50% 10 days A B 
6 60% 200 days  40% 160 days  60% 385 days  40% 10 days A B 
7 70% 200 days  30% 160 days  70% 385 days  30% 10 days A B 
8 80% 200 days  20% 160 days  80% 385 days  20% 10 days A B 
9 90% 200 days  10% 160 days  90% 385 days  10% 10 days A B 
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Q1.14 Think of the following hypothetical scenarios. Suppose you currently suffer from a 
specific medical condition that has an impact on your health. You can choose between two 
medical treatments, A and B. Treatment A is available at a later date whilst treatment B is 
available today. When you start the treatment regardless of the starting date, its effects will 
last for the days stated in each option. For example, in the first choice, treatment A will give 
you full health for 360 days starting in one week’s time, and treatment B will give you 60 
days of full health starting from today. At the end of the treatment you go back to your 
initial state, i.e. the state you were before you started the treatment, and no further 
treatment will be allowed. 
 
There are no other differences between the two treatments. Please, for each of the following 
rows, choose the option that you prefer between treatment A and treatment B. Please, make 
your choice for each row/pair, by putting a circle around either A or B in the last columns. 
Remember there are no right or wrong answers. It’s your personal choices we are interested 
in. 
 
ID Treatment A Treatment B Your 
choice 
1  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
60 days in full health starting today A B 
2  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
120 days in full health starting today A B 
3  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
180 days in full health  starting today A B 
4  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
240 days in full health starting today A B 
5  360 days in full health starting  
in 1 week 
300 days in full health starting today A B 
6  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
60 days in full health starting today A B 
7  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
120 days in full health starting today A B 
8  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
180 days in full health starting today A B 
9  360 days in full health starting  
in 1 month 
240 days in full health starting today A B 
10  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
300 days in full health starting today A B 
11  360 days in full health starting  
in 3 months 
60 days in full health starting today A B 
12  360 days in full health starting  
in 3 months 
120 days in full health starting today A B 
13  360 days in full health starting  
in 3 months 
180 days in full health starting today A B 
14  360 days in full health starting  
in 3 months 
240 days in full health starting today A B 
15  360 days in full health starting 
in 3 months 
300 days in full health starting today A B 
16  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
150 days in full health starting today A B 
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17  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
300 days in full health starting today A B 
18  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
450 days in full health starting today A B 
19  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
600 days in full health starting today A B 
20  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
750 days in full health starting today A B 
21  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
150 days in full health starting today A B 
22  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
300 days in full health starting today A B 
23  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
450 days in full starting health today A B 
24  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
600 days in full health starting today A B 
25  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
750 days in full health starting today A B 
26  900 days in full health starting 
in 3 months 
150 days in full health starting today A B 
27  900 days in full health starting 
in 3 months 
300 days in full health starting today A B 
28  900 days in full health starting 
in 3 months 
450 days in full health starting today A B 
29  900 days in full health starting 
in 3 months 
600 days in full health starting today A B 
30  900 days in full health starting 
in 3 months 
750 days in full health starting today A B 
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For statistical purposes we would like to ask you the following... 
 
Q1.15 What is your date of birth? 
 
 
Q1.16 What is you sex? (please circle as appropriate) 
 
Male Female 
 
Q1.17 What is the highest level of education you have completed?   (please circle) 
a. Never been to school 
b. Primary School 
c. Junior High School 
d. High School 
e. Technical School 
f. Technical College 
g. University 
h. Post-Graduate studies 
i. (DA) 
 
Q1.18 What is your marital status? (please circle as appropriate) 
 
Single Married Divorced Widow (NA) 
 
Q1.19 Do you have children? (please circle as appropriate) 
 
Yes No (NA) 
 
Q1.20 Are you currently living alone? (please circle as appropriate) 
Yes No (NA) 
 
 
Q1.21 Which of the following descriptions comes closest to how you feel about your 
household’s income nowadays?  
Living comfortably on present income  
  Coping on present income  
Find it difficult on present income  
Finding it very difficult on present income  
(NA)  
 
Q1.22 Thinking of your monthly personal income, is this: 
 
Less than 600 
Euros 
601- 1000 
Euros 
1001-1500 
Euros 
1501-2000 
Euros 
2000-3000 Euros More than 3000 
 
Day Month Year 
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Αξιότιμη/ε Κυρία/Kύριε 
 
Θα θέλαμε να σα̋ προσκαλέσουμε να λάβετε μέρο̋ σε μια έρευνα που μελετά τι̋ 
προσωπικέ̋ απόψει̋ σα̋ σχετικά με την υγεία και τον τρόπο ζωή σα̋ γενικότερα. Η 
έρευνα αποτελείται από δύο μέρη. Το πρώτο μέρο̋ πραγματοποιείται ενώ περιμένετε να 
δείτε το γιατρό σα̋ και διαρκεί 15 λεπτά. Το δεύτερο μέρο̋ θα ολοκληρωθεί αφού δείτε 
το γιατρό σα̋ και διαρκεί 5 λεπτά. 
 
Η έρευνα πραγματοποιείται αυστηρά για ακαδημαϊκού̋ λόγου̋ και τόσο το νοσοκομείο 
όσο και ο γιατρό̋ σα̋ δεν έχει οποιαδήποτε συμμετοχή σε αυτή. Όλε̋ οι απαντήσει̋ θα 
παραμείνουν απολύτω̋ ανώνυμε̋ και εμπιστευτικέ̋.  
 
Σα̋ ευχαριστούμε για το χρόνο σα̋. 
 
Με φιλικού̋ χαιρετισμού̋, 
Η Ερευνητική Ομάδα  
 
ΕΡ. 1.01 Πώ̋ είναι η υγεία σα̋ γενικά; Θα λέγατε ότι είναι… (παρακαλώ κυκλώστε 
ανάλογα) 
 
Πολύ 
καλή 
Καλή Ικανοποιητική Άσχημη Πολύ 
Άσχημη 
(ΔΑ) 
 
 
ΕΡ. 1.02 Στι̋ καθημερινέ̋ σα̋ δραστηριότητε̋ συναντάτε εμπόδια εξαιτία̋ κάποια̋  
μακρόχρονη̋ ασθένεια̋ ή αδυναμία̋, αναπηρία̋ ή κάποιου προβλήματο̋ ψυχική̋ υγεία̋; 
Εάν ναι, πολύ ή σε κάποιο βαθμό; (παρακαλώ κυκλώστε ανάλογα) 
 
Ναι, 
πολύ 
Ναι, σε κάποιο  
βαθμό 
Όχι 
 
ΕΡ. 1.03 Καπνίζετε ή καπνίζατε ποτέ; (παρακαλώ κυκλώστε ανάλογα) 
 
Καπνίζω 
καθημερινά 
Καπνίζω 
περιστασιακά  
Δεν καπνίζω, 
αλλά κάπνιζα  
καθημερινά 
Δεν καπνίζω, 
αλλά κάπνιζα  
περιστασιακά 
Ποτέ 
δεν  
κάπνιζα 
 
ΕΡ. 1.04 Εάν καπνίζετε, πόσα τσιγάρα καπνίζετε κατά μέσον όρο την ημέρα; 
(παρακαλώ σημειώστε  τον αριθμό τσιγάρων) 
 
ΕΡ. 1.05 Πόσε̋ μονάδε̋ αλκοόλ πίνετε την εβδομάδα; (μια μονάδα αλκοόλ 
αντιστοιχεί με ένα μικρό ποτήρι του κρασιού, ένα μεσαίο ποτήρι τη̋ μπύρα̋ ή ένα ποτό 
όπω̋ ουίσκυ, βότκα κτλ.). 
 
 
 
 
ΕΡ. 1.06 Πόσε̋ ώρε̋ εβδομαδιαίω̋ ξοδεύετε συνήθω̋ σε μέτριε̋ σωματικέ̋ 
δραστηριότητε̋; Ω̋ σωματική δραστηριότητα θεωρούμε οποιαδήποτε μέτρια σωματική 
δραστηριότητα που διαρκεί για τουλάχιστον 40 συνεχόμενα λεπτά (όπω̋ το περπάτημα, το 
καθάρισμα, την κηπουρική). 
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ΕΡ. 1.07 Πόσε̋ ώρε̋ εβδομαδιαίω̋ ξοδεύετε συνήθω̋ σε έντονε̋ σωματικέ̋ 
δραστηριότητε̋; Ω̋ σωματική δραστηριότητα θεωρούμε οποιαδήποτε έντονη σωματική 
δραστηριότητα που διαρκεί για τουλάχιστον 40 συνεχόμενα λεπτά (όπω̋ το ποδήλατο, το 
γρήγορο περπάτημα, το γυμναστήριο, την αεροβική γυμναστική, την κολύμβηση, το 
ποδόσφαιρο κ.λπ.). 
 
 
ΕΡ. 1.08 Παρακαλώ υποδείξτε εάν κάθε μια από τι̋ ακόλουθε̋ δηλώσει̋ ισχύει ή όχι όσον 
αφορά τη συμπεριφορά σα̋: (βάλτε Χ στην αντίστοιχη στήλη) 
 Συμφωνώ 
απόλυτα Συμφωνώ 
Εξαρτάται Διαφωνώ  Διαφωνώ 
απόλυτα 
α.   Δεν λαμβάνω ποτέ απόφαση 
για την οποία θα μετανοιώσω 
στο μέλλον 
     
β.   Δεν μπορώ ποτέ να 
προσδιορίσω ποια επιλογή 
είναι καλύτερη για μένα 
     
γ.   Η ζωή είναι σαν το λαχείο. Το 
να είσαι ευτυχή̋, είναι απλώ̋ 
ζήτημα τύχη̋ 
     
δ.   Οι προβλέψει̋ μου είναι πάντα 
σωστέ̋      
 
 
ΕΡ. 1.09 Δώστε ένα ποσοστό σε κάθε μια από τι̋ ακόλουθε̋ ερωτήσει̋: 
 Ποσοστό 
(%) 
α.   Ποιο ποσοστό ανθρώπων τη̋ ηλικία̋ σα̋ έχει καλύτερη εργασία από 
σα̋, εξαιτία̋ καλύτερων εφοδίων; 
 
β.   Ποιο ποσοστό των γειτόνων σα̋ θα πετύχει καλύτερα στη ζωή όταν 
συγκριθεί μαζί σα̋ λόγω καλύτερων ικανοτήτων του̋; 
 
γ.   Ποιο ποσοστό των ανθρώπων τη̋ ηλικία̋ σα̋ έχει υψηλότερε̋ 
αποδοχέ̋ για καλύτερη απόδοση στη δουλειά του̋;  
 
 
 
 
 
ΕΡ. 1.10 Πώ̋ βλέπω τον εαυτό μου: (βάλτε Χ στην αντίστοιχη στήλη) 
 Συμφωνώ 
απόλυτα  
Συμφων
ώ 
Δεν 
είμαι 
βέβαιο̋ 
 
Διαφωνώ 
Διαφωνώ 
απόλυτα 
α.    Είμαι τολμηρό άτομο που 
διατρέχει γενικά κινδύνου̋.      
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β.     Παίρνω  πρωτοβουλία, 
αναζητώντα̋  ευκαιρίε̋ ακόμα 
και όταν ενέχουν κάποιο κίνδυνο. 
     
γ.     Είμαι προσεκτικό άτομο που 
αποφεύγει γενικά του̋ κινδύνου̋. 
     
δ.    Κάνω πράγματα πάντα με 
ασφάλεια ακόμα κι αν σημαίνει 
περιστασιακά ότι μπορεί να χάσω 
μια καλή ευκαιρία. 
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ΕΡ. 1.11. Παρακαλώ, για κάθε μια από τι̋ ακόλουθε̋ σειρέ̋, κάθε μια από τι̋ οποίε̋ 
περιέχει ένα ζευγάρι υποθετικών εναλλακτικών λαχνών, επιλέξτε τον λαχνό που προτιμάτε 
μεταξύ του Α και του Β. Ο λαχνό̋ Α σα̋ δίνει είτε 200 € ή 160 € με κάποιε̋ πιθανότητε̋ 
που αλλάζουν σταδιακά σε κάθε σειρά. Ο λαχνό̋ Β σα̋ δίνει είτε 385 € είτε 10 € με κάποιε̋ 
πιθανότητε̋ που επίση̋ αλλάζουν σταδιακά σε κάθε σειρά.  Για παράδειγμα, στη σειρά 1, ο 
λαχνό̋ Α σα̋ δίνει 200 € με πιθανότητα 10% και 160 € με πιθανότητα 90%, ενώ ο λαχνό̋ Β 
σα̋ δίνει 385 € με πιθανότητα 10% και 10 € με πιθανότητα 90%. Παρακαλώ, επιλέξτε για 
κάθε σειρά το λαχνό που προτιμάτε, κυκλώνοντα̋ είτε το Α είτε το Β στην τελευταία στήλη. 
Θυμηθείτε ότι δεν υπάρχουν σωστέ̋ ή λανθασμένε̋ απαντήσει̋. Είναι οι προσωπικέ̋ 
επιλογέ̋ σα̋ που μα̋ ενδιαφέρουν. 
 
α/α Λαχνό̋ Α Λαχνό̋ Β Η Επιλογή σα̋ 
 Π € Π € Π € Π € Α Β 
1 10% 200 90% 160 10% 385 90% 10 Α Β 
2 20% 200 80% 160 20% 385 80% 10 Α Β 
3 30% 200 70% 160 30% 385 70% 10 Α Β 
4 40% 200 60% 160 40% 385 60% 10 Α Β 
5 50% 200 50% 160 50% 385 50% 10 Α Β 
6 60% 200 40% 160 60% 385 40% 10 Α Β 
7 70% 200 30% 160 70% 385 30% 10 Α Β 
8 80% 200 20% 160 80% 385 20% 10 Α Β 
9 90% 200 10% 160 90% 385 10% 10 Α Β 
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ΕΡ. 1.12 Παρακαλώ, για κάθε μια από τι̋ ακόλουθε̋ σειρέ̋, κάθε μια από τι̋ οποίε̋ 
περιέχει ένα ζευγάρι υποθετικών εναλλακτικών επιλογών, επιλέξτε αυτή που προτιμάτε 
μεταξύ τη̋ επιλογή̋ Α και τη̋ επιλογή̋ Β. Και οι δύο επιλογέ̋ σα̋ δίνουν ορισμένε̋ 
χρηματικέ̋ πληρωμέ̋. Οι πληρωμέ̋ στην επιλογή Α θα γίνουν στο μέλλον (όπω̋ 
υποδεικνύεται σε κάθε σειρά) ενώ οι πληρωμέ̋ στην επιλογή Β γίνονται σήμερα. 
Παρακαλώ, για κάθε σειρά επιλέξτε ποια από τι̋ επιλογέ̋ Α ή Β προτιμάτε, κυκλώνοντα̋ 
είτε το Α είτε το Β στην τελευταία στήλη. Θυμηθείτε ότι δεν υπάρχουν σωστέ̋ ή 
λανθασμένε̋ απαντήσει̋. Είναι οι προσωπικέ̋ επιλογέ̋ σα̋ που μα̋ ενδιαφέρουν. 
 
α/α Επιλογή A                  Επιλογή B Η Επιλογή 
1 Θα λάβετε 360 € σε 1 βδομάδα Λαμβάνετε 60 € σήμερα A B 
2 Θα λάβετε 360 € σε 1 βδομάδα Λαμβάνετε 120 € σήμερα A B 
3 Θα λάβετε 360 € σε 1 βδομάδα Λαμβάνετε 180 € σήμερα A B 
4 Θα λάβετε 360 € σε 1 βδομάδα Λαμβάνετε 240 € σήμερα A B 
5 Θα λάβετε 360 € σε 1 βδομάδα Λαμβάνετε 300 € σήμερα A B 
 
 
    
6 Θα λάβετε 360 € σε 1 μήνα Λαμβάνετε 60 € σήμερα A B 
7 Θα λάβετε 360 € σε 1 μήνα Λαμβάνετε 120 € σήμερα A B 
8 Θα λάβετε 360 € σε 1 μήνα Λαμβάνετε 180 € σήμερα A B 
9 Θα λάβετε 360 € σε 1 μήνα Λαμβάνετε 240 € σήμερα A B 
10 Θα λάβετε 360 € σε 1 μήνα Λαμβάνετε 300 € σήμερα A B 
     
11 Θα λάβετε 360 € σε 3 μήνεs Λαμβάνετε 60 € σήμερα A B 
12 Θα λάβετε 360 € σε 3 μήνεs Λαμβάνετε 120 € σήμερα A B 
13 Θα λάβετε 360 € σε 3 μήνεs Λαμβάνετε 180 € σήμερα A B 
14 Θα λάβετε 360 € σε 3 μήνεs Λαμβάνετε 240 € σήμερα A B 
15 Θα λάβετε 360 € σε 3 μήνεs Λαμβάνετε 300 € σήμερα A B 
     
16 Θα λάβετε 900 € σε 1 βδομάδα Λαμβάνετε 150 € σήμερα A B 
17 Θα λάβετε 900 € σε 1 βδομάδα Λαμβάνετε 300 € σήμερα A B 
18 Θα λάβετε 900 € σε 1 βδομάδα Λαμβάνετε 450 € σήμερα A B 
19 Θα λάβετε 900 € σε 1 βδομάδα Λαμβάνετε 600 € σήμερα A B 
20 Θα λάβετε 900 € σε 1 βδομάδα Λαμβάνετε 750 € σήμερα A B 
     
21 Θα λάβετε 900 € σε 1 μήνα Λαμβάνετε 150 € σήμερα A B 
22 Θα λάβετε 900 € σε 1 μήνα Λαμβάνετε 300 € σήμερα A B 
23 Θα λάβετε 900 € σε 1 μήνα Λαμβάνετε 450 € σήμερα A B 
24 Θα λάβετε 900 € σε 1 μήνα Λαμβάνετε 600 € σήμερα A B 
25 Θα λάβετε 900 € σε 1 μήνα Λαμβάνετε 750 € σήμερα A B 
     
26 Θα λάβετε 900 € σε 3 μήνεs Λαμβάνετε 150 € σήμερα A B 
27 Θα λάβετε 900 € σε 3 μήνεs Λαμβάνετε 300 € σήμερα A B 
28 Θα λάβετε 900 € σε 3 μήνεs Λαμβάνετε 450 € σήμερα A B 
29 Θα λάβετε 900 € σε 3 μήνεs Λαμβάνετε 600 € σήμερα A B 
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30 Θα λάβετε 900 € σε 3 μήνεs Λαμβάνετε 750 € σήμερα A B 
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ΕΡ. 1.13. Παρακαλώ σκεφτείτε τα ακόλουθα υποθετικά σενάρια. Υποθέστε ότι πρέπει να 
επιλέξετε μεταξύ δύο θεραπειών, Α και Β, σχετικά με ένα πρόβλημα υγεία̋ που σα̋ 
απασχολεί. Η επίδραση τη̋ θεραπεία̋ Α διαρκεί είτε 200 μέρε̋ είτε 160 μέρε̋ κάποιε̋ 
πιθανότητε̋ που αλλάζουν σταδιακά σε κάθε σειρά. Η επίδραση τη̋ θεραπεία̋ Β διαρκεί 
είτε 385 μέρε̋ είτε 10 μέρε̋ με κάποιε̋ πιθανότητε̋ που επίση̋ αλλάζουν σταδιακά σε κάθε 
σειρά. Εσεί̋ ξέρετε τι̋ πιθανότητε̋ με τι̋ οποίε̋ αυτό θα συμβεί. Ανεξάρτητα από το ποια 
θεραπεία  επιλέξετε, για όσο χρονικό διάστημα διαρκεί η επίδρασή του̋ θα είστε σε πλήρη 
υγεία. Αφότου περάσει η επίδραση, επιστρέφετε στην αρχική κατάσταση υγεία̋ σα̋ 
και στι̋ δύο περιπτώσει̋ και δεν μπορείτε να λάβετε άλλη αγωγή.  
 
Για παράδειγμα, στη σειρά 1, η θεραπεία Α θα σα̋ δώσει 200 μέρε̋ πλήρου̋ υγεία̋ με 
πιθανότητα 10% ή 160 μέρε̋ πλήρου̋ υγεία̋ με πιθανότητα 90%. Η θεραπεία Β σα̋ δίνει 
385 μέρε̋ πλήρου̋ υγεία̋ με πιθανότητα 10% ή 10 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία με πιθανότητα 
90%.  
 
Παρακαλώ, κάντε την επιλογή σα̋ για κάθε σειρά, κυκλώνοντα̋ είτε από το Α είτε το Β 
στην τελευταία στήλη. Θυμηθείτε ότι δεν υπάρχουν σωστέ̋ ή λανθασμένε̋ απαντήσει̋. 
Είναι οι προσωπικέ̋ επιλογέ̋ σα̋ που μα̋ ενδιαφέρουν. 
 
 Θεραπεία Α Θεραπεία Β Επιλογή  
 Π Μήνε̋ σε  
πλήρη υγεία 
Π Μήνε̋ σε 
πλήρη υγεία 
Π Μήνε̋ σε 
πλήρη υγεία 
Π Μήνε̋ σε  
πλήρη 
υγεία 
Α Β 
1 10% 200 μέρε̋ 90% 160 μέρε̋ 10% 385 μέρε̋  90% 10 μέρε̋ Α Β 
2 20% 200 μέρε̋  80% 160 μέρε̋ 20% 385 μέρε̋  80% 10 μέρε̋ Α Β 
3 30% 200 μέρε̋  70% 160 μέρε̋ 30% 385 μέρε̋  70% 10 μέρε̋ Α Β 
4 40% 200 μέρε̋  60% 160 μέρε̋  40% 385 μέρε̋  60% 10 μέρε̋ Α Β 
5 50% 200 μέρε̋  50% 160 μέρε̋  50% 385 μέρε̋  50% 10 μέρε̋ Α Β 
6 60% 200 μέρε̋ 40% 160 μέρε̋  60% 385 μέρε̋  40% 10 μέρε̋ Α Β 
7 70% 200 μέρε̋  30% 160 μέρε̋  70% 385 μέρε̋  30% 10 μέρε̋ Α Β 
8 80% 200 μέρε̋  20% 160 μέρε̋ 80% 385 μέρε̋  20% 10 μέρε̋ Α Β 
9 90% 200 μέρε̋ 10% 160 μέρε̋ 90% 385 μέρε̋ 10% 10 μέρε̋ Α Β 
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ΕΡ. 1.14 Εξετάστε τα ακόλουθα υποθετικά σενάρια. Υποθέστε ότι έχετε ένα πρόβλημα 
υγεία̋ που σα̋ απασχολεί. Μπορείτε να επιλέξετε μεταξύ δύο θεραπειών, Α και Β. Η 
θεραπεία A είναι διαθέσιμη σε κάποια στιγμή στο μέλλον ενώ η Β είναι διαθέσιμη σήμερα. 
Όταν αρχίσετε τη θεραπεία, ανεξάρτητα από το πότε αυτή θα ξεκινήσει, η επίδραση θα 
διαρκεί για όσο διάστημα αναφέρεται σε κάθε επιλογή. Για παράδειγμα, στην πρώτη 
επιλογή, η θεραπεία Α θα σα̋ φέρει σε πλήρη υγεία για 360 μέρε̋ ξεκινώντα̋ σε μια 
εβδομάδα, ενώ η Β θα σα̋ φέρει σε 60 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ από σήμερα. Στο 
τέλο̋ τη̋ θεραπεία̋ επιστρέφετε στην αρχική σα̋ κατάσταση, δηλαδή την κατάστασή 
σα̋ προτού αρχίσετε την θεραπεία, και δεν μπορείτε να λάβετε άλλη αγωγή.  
 
Δεν υπάρχει καμία άλλη διαφορά μεταξύ των δύο θεραπειών. Παρακαλώ, για κάθε μια από 
τι̋ ακόλουθε̋ σειρέ̋, επιλέξτε αυτή που προτιμάτε μεταξύ τη̋ θεραπεία̋ Α και τη̋ 
θεραπεία̋ Β. Παρακαλώ, κάντε την επιλογή σα̋ για κάθε σειρά, κυκλώνοντα̋  είτε το Α 
είτε το Β στην τελευταία στήλη. Θυμηθείτε ότι δεν υπάρχουν σωστέ̋ ή λανθασμένε̋ 
απαντήσει̋. Είναι οι προσωπικέ̋ επιλογέ̋ σα̋ που μα̋ ενδιαφέρουν. 
 
α/
α 
Θεραπεία A Θεραπεία B Επι-
λογή  
1  360 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 1 βδομάδα 
60 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
2  360 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 1 βδομάδα 
120 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
3  360 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 1 βδομάδα 
180 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
4  360 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 1 βδομάδα 
240 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
5  360 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 1 βδομάδα 
300 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
     
6  360 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 1 μήνα  
60 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
7  360 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε1 μήνα  
120 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
8  360 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 1 μήνα  
180 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
9  360 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 1 μήνα  
240 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
10  360 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 1 μήνα  
300 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
     
11  360 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 3 μήνε̋  
60 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
12  360 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 3 μήνε̋  
120 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
13  360 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 3 μήνε̋  
180 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
14  360 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 3 μήνε̋  
240 μέρε̋  σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
15  360 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 3 μήνε̋  
300 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
     
16  900 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 150 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία A B 
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τη θεραπεία σε 1 βδομάδα ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
17  900 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 1 βδομάδα 
300 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
18  900 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 1 βδομάδα 
450 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
19  900 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 1 βδομάδα 
600 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
20  900 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 1 βδομάδα 
750 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
     
21  900 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 1 μήνα  
150 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
22  900 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 1 μήνα 
300 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
23  900 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 1 μήνα  
450 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
24  900 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 1 μήνα  
600 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
25  900 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 1 μήνα  
750 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
     
26  900 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 3 μήνε̋  
150 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
27  900 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 3 μήνε̋  
300 μέρε̋  σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
28  900 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 3 μήνε̋  
450 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
29  900 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 3 μήνε̋  
600 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
30  900 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία ξεκινώντα̋ 
τη θεραπεία σε 3 μήνε̋  
750 μέρε̋ σε πλήρη υγεία 
ξεκινώντα̋ τη θεραπεία σήμερα 
A B 
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Για στατιστικού̋ λόγου̋ θα θέλαμε να σα̋ ρωτήσουμε … 
ΕΡ. 1.15 Ποια είναι η ημερομηνία γέννησή̋ 
σα̋; 
 
ΕΡ. 1.16 Ποιο είναι το φύλο σα̋; (παρακαλώ κυκλώστε ανάλογα) 
 
Άντρα̋ Γυναίκα 
 
ΕΡ. 1.17 Ποιο είναι το ανώτατο επίπεδο εκπαίδευση̋ που έχετε ολοκληρώσει;   (παρακαλώ 
κυκλώστε) 
α. Ποτέ μου δεν πήγα σχολείο 
β. Δημοτικό Σχολείο 
γ. 3τάξιου Γυμνάσιο 
δ. Λύκειο ή 6τάξιο Γυμνάσιο 
ε. ΙΕΚ/Τεχνική Σχολή 
στ. ΤΕΙ 
ζ. ΑΕΙ 
η. Μεταπτυχιακέ̋ σπουδέ̋  
 
ΕΡ. 1.18 Ποια είναι η οικογενειακή σα̋ κατάσταση; (παρακαλώ κυκλώστε) 
 
Άγαμο̋ Παντρεμένο̋ Διαζευγμένο̋ Χήρο̋/α 
 
 
ΕΡ. 1.19 Έχετε παιδιά; (παρακαλώ κυκλώστε ανάλογα) 
 
Ναι Όχι 
 
ΕΡ. 1.20 Μένετε μόνοι αυτήν την περίοδο; (παρακαλώ κυκλώστε ανάλογα) 
 
Ναι Όχι 
 
ΕΡ. 1.21 Ποιε̋ από τι̋ ακόλουθε̋ περιγραφέ̋ σα̋ αποδίδουν καλύτερα για το πώ̋ 
αισθάνεστε για το οικιακό εισόδημά σα̋ σήμερα; (σημειώστε με Χ) 
 
Ζω άνετα με το παρόν εισόδημα  
   Τα καταφέρνω με το παρόν εισόδημα  
Τα βγάζω πέρα δύσκολα με το παρόν εισόδημα  
Το βγάζω πέρα πολύ δύσκολα με το παρόν εισόδημα  
 (ΔΑ)  
 
ΕΡ. 1.22 Το μηνιαίο ατομικό εισόδημά σα̋, είναι: (παρακαλώ κυκλώστε) 
 
Λιγότερο από 
600 Ευρώ 
600-1000 
Ευρώ 
1001-1500 
Ευρώ 
1501-2000 
Ευρώ 
2001-3000 
Ευρώ 
Περισσότερα από 
3000 Ευρώ 
 
ΣΑΣ ΕΥΧΑΡΙΣΤΟΥΜΕ ΠΟΛΥ 
 
 
Ημέρα Μήνα̋ Έτο̋ 
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Online Appendix B - Comparing the finance and health domains 
The conversion rate between one unit of money and of time in full health was a key 
consideration in our methodological discussion. Our main objective was to choose lengths of 
time in full health that were conspicuous and realistic for some hypothetical healthcare 
treatments. A natural and intuitive choice was to use days in full health as unitary interval in 
the health domain. The implicit conversion rate between the financial and the health domain 
of one euro per day in full health was based on several considerations. 
 
In a nutshell, the implicit rate of conversion was based on the evidence from a pilot 
experiment run with a sample of patients from the same hospital having similar 
characteristics to the respondents in our experiment. As discussed, prior to finalizing the 
design of the main fieldwork, we conducted a pilot experiment involving 32 subjects 
attending a sub-set of outpatient clinics at the Laiko Hospital. In addition to checking the 
comprehension and general validity of the questionnaire, the aim of the pilot was also to 
gather information about the description of their current health states by the respondents, 
using the Euroqol EQ-5D classification, and to obtain estimate of the approximate ‘rate of 
substitution’ between money and days in full health by patients. 
 
In the pilot, subjects were first asked to self-assess their own health on the usual 1-5 Likert 
scale and to describe their current health states using the EQ-5D system, rating 5 distinct 
health-related dimensions (mobility, self-care, usual activities, pain/discomfort, 
anxiety/depression) using 3-values scales (no, moderate, or severe problems). The EQ-5D 
has been extensively used in health economics as it allows one to summarise each health 
state using a 5-digit index, e.g., 11121 for a person who does not have any problem (level 1) 
except a moderate pain or discomfort in the fourth dimension (level 2). It also allows 
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attaching quality-of-life ‘tariffs’ to each of the 243 possible scenarios as estimated from 
preferences over health states from representative samples of the general population (1).  
 
Half of the subjects in the pilot experiment were then given a questionnaire containing the 
experimental questions to elicit risk preferences in the finance domain first, followed by the 
questionnaire, and the tests for risk preferences in the health domain, while the order was 
reversed for the other half of the respondents. Further, subjects provided their ‘willingness-
to-pay’ for one day in full health using methods similar to Gyrd-Hansen (2) and Pinto-
Prades, Loomes and Brey (3).  
 
The results from the pilot experiment proved useful to gather insights to finalise the design 
of the main experiment. First, the domain order manipulation allowed us to gather informal 
insights on the general comprehension of the paired-lottery tests. When interacting with the 
research assistants, participants seemed to better understand the structure of the choice 
between healthcare treatments when they had previously answered analogous MPL tests 
with money. The final choice of presenting to all subjects the risky lotteries in finance 
before the ones in health was informed by this feedback from the pilot, as well as by the 
analogous design by Prosser and Wittenberg (4) who also present the monetary questions 
first. This design feature, however, does not allow us to explicitly account for possible order 
effects of responses across different domains: to do so, one should randomly allocate 
subjects to counterbalanced orders of the two lottery domains, an opportunity that was 
beyond our capability. 
 
Second, as expected for patients in outpatient clinics, most subjects described themselves as 
affected by health conditions characterized by only moderate pain or discomfort, anxiety or 
distress, in health states corresponding to the ‘very mild’ ones (e.g., 21111, 12111, 11211, 
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11121, 11112) or the ‘relatively mild’ ones (e.g., 12211, 12121, 11122, 22121, 22112, 
21222, 11311).  
 
The quality-of-life tariffs estimated from the Time Trade-Off (TTO) method associated to 
these health states varied between 0.556 (state 11311) and 0.883 (state 11211), with 1 being, 
by definition, the value attached to full health and 0 to death. We computed an average 
quality-of-life tariff for patients in our pilot as the average of the tariffs in each EQ-5D state 
weighted by the relative number of respondents (out of the 32 interviewed) who describe 
themselves as affected by that state, which returned a value of 0.751. 
 
In addition, the answers to the procedure designed by Pinto-Prades, Loomes and Brey (3) to 
elicit the WTP for 4 months in full health indicated that virtually all subjects’ maximum 
WTPs were included in the range between €25 and €50 a month, corresponding to a 
maximum expense of about €300-600 a year. The average WTP for the medicine B in the 
pilot sample was €42.4 a month, corresponding to an expenditure of €509 a year, roughly 
the amount of the basic monthly wage in Greece. As this maximum amount was traded by 
subjects in our pilot in exchange for 4 hypothetical months in full health, the monetary value 
attached to one day in full health was about €4.24. This figure is in line with the evidence 
from Spain by Pinto-Prades, Loomes and Brey (3) who experimentally elicited and 
estimated the mean WTP to avoid 3 days in a health status characterized by a moderate pain 
or discomfort (state 11121 in EQ-5D) in €12.5.14  
 
                                                 
14 However, both figures are less directly comparable with alternative estimates for other countries using 
different methods: the estimated monetary value for one quality-adjusted-life-year (QALY) typically span 
within a range between DKK88,000 (about €12,000) in Denmark  (eliciting WTP for a QALY (2)) and 
US$24,777 (about €18,000) in the US (using the human capital estimate method (5)). These alternative 
estimates implicitly attach to one day in full health a monetary value ranging from about €33 to about €50. 
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The monetary value of about €4.24 attached to one day in full health, thus, served as 
reference figure to estimate the additional amount of money that gives a marginal utility to 
subjects in our sample equal to the marginal utility of receiving one additional day in full 
health, in order to keep the ‘marginal rate of substitution’ between the lotteries in the finance 
and health domain as close as possible to 1. In fact, the marginal utility attached by patients 
to the idea of receiving a hypothetical extra day in full health is the marginal benefit of 
moving from their actual health state to a state of full health for one day. If the utility per 
day is measured in terms of quality of life, consistent with the CUA approach and the 
construction of the quality-adjusted-life-year (QALY) measure, the marginal utility of an 
additional day in full health is the difference between the quality-of-life tariff in full health 
and the one for the current health state, that is 1-0.751=0.249. Therefore, the monetary value 
associated to such a marginal utility can be estimated to be 0.249*(€4.24) = €1.06, 
suggesting that an additional euro added to the individual ‘mental account’ in the finance 
domain had approximately the same marginal utility of a hypothetical additional day in full 
health in the health domain. This finding was the main argument supporting our design 
choice to use a number of euros for the monetary lotteries directly corresponding to the 
number of days in full health in the health lotteries.  
 
While this one-to-one equivalence assumption has the further attraction of being a natural 
and intuitive option, it should be openly acknowledged that the correspondence of the 
outcomes across the two domains is a key assumption that clearly impacts the cross-domain 
comparisons. In particular, underlying our design choice under both the EUT and the RDU 
model is the assumption that subjects use a CRRA utility function. If, however, subjects use 
a non-constant RRA utility function, and, for instance, exhibit an increasing or decreasing 
RRA, then our assumed equivalence across domains introduces a major confounder in the 
analysis, and represents a critical limitation of the design.  
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Another clear limitation of our analysis is related to the sample selection. Together with the 
conceptual distinction between background and foreground risk in the money and health 
domains, the potential sample selection issue should be kept in mind when interpreting the 
cross-domain differences in risk preferences. The sample selection could indeed favour the 
observation that subjects in our sample show higher risk aversion in the health than in the 
financial domain. The different nature of background and foreground risk can instead work 
both ways (6). On the one hand, the addition of background risk from experiencing the 
economic crisis can make subjects more risk averse with respect to any independent risk in 
money and health, a phenomenon known as risk vulnerability (7). On the other hand, if 
subjects are already exposed to sufficiently high background risk, they might pay little 
attention to any additional, small, increase of risk, especially in money, consistently with the 
idea of diminishing sensitivity to risk (8). In principle, one could attempt to correct for such 
issues by comparing risk preference responses across domains between our sample of 
patients in outpatient clinics and another sample which is representative of the general 
population in Greece; or by comparing those two groups with a third sample of subjects 
recruited in a ‘reverse’ setting - e.g. an employment benefit centre - where they are likely to 
feel apprehensive in the financial domain. More research is needed to systematically assess 
the robustness of similarities and differences of risk preferences across domains using a 
range of different conversion values and subject pools. 
 
While such possibilities were beyond the scope of our study, in our econometric analysis we 
controlled for individual heterogeneity in the relative cross-domain wellbeing, by including 
individual responses to questions assessing the self-reported baseline levels of the health 
status, as well as of the income and financial conditions. 
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Online Appendix C - Econometric approach  
 
To empirically estimate risk preferences we follow the Maximum Likelihood (ML) 
econometric approach by Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (9–11) and Harrison and 
Rutström (12). In particular, we adapt the Stata template code in Harrison and Rutström 
(13). In a nutshell, the ML approach estimates the latent risk preference parameters by 
calculating the likelihood of picking one specific lottery in each question, given its induced 
probabilities and outcomes. More in detail, using a CRRA utility function  and 
the probabilities  for each outcome  induced by the experiment (depending on the 
domain of the choice, either a monetary outcome or a health outcome ), the expected 
utility (EU) for lottery i is given by (1): 
 
 (1) 
 
Based on a candidate value of  a latent preference index  can be constructed. We use 
the simple stochastic specification by and Holt and Laury (2002), allowing some behavioral 
Fechner errors in the sense of Hey and Orme (14), and also accounting for ‘contextual 
errors’ in the sense of Wilcox (15): for each lottery pair, the EU for each lottery is calculated 
for candidate estimates of r and , and the ratio (2) 
 
  (2) 
 
is calculated, where EUA refers to Option A and EUB to Option B;  is a normalizing 
‘contextual’ term defined as the maximum utility over all prizes in that lottery pair, minus 
the minimum utility over all prizes in that lottery pair, varying, in principle, from lottery pair 
to lottery pair, and ensuring that the normalized difference in expected utility remains in the 
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unit interval; and, finally,  is a structural ‘noise parameter’ used to allow some errors from 
the perspective of the deterministic EUT model. In particular, as  this specification 
collapses to the deterministic choice EUT model, where the individual choice is strictly 
determined by the expected utilities of the two lotteries, but as  gets larger the choice 
becomes random. When  the above specification reduces to one where the probability 
of picking one lottery is given by the ratio of the expected utility of one lottery to the sum of 
the expected utilities of both lotteries (adjusted by the ‘contextual’ term). 
 
The latent index  is in the form of a cumulative probability distribution function defined 
over differences in the expected utilities of the two lotteries, the ‘contextual’ term , and the 
‘noise’ parameter . The latent index function, based on latent preferences, is then linked to 
observed choices using a logistic cumulative probability distribution function . This 
‘logit’-type function takes any argument and transforms it into a number between 0 and 1, so 
that prob(choose lottery A) = .  
 
Thus the likelihood of the risk preferences responses depends on the estimates of r and , 
and on the observed choices. Since, in our experimental tasks, subjects could not manifest 
indifference between the two options, the conditional log-likelihood function is (3): 
 
 (3) 
 
Where  denotes lottery B and  denotes lottery A in a risk preferences task i.  
 
As mentioned, in our estimates we pool all observations together and include a categorical 
variable (‘H’) to control for whether the responses refer to the financial (H=0) or the health 
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domains (H=1). Thus, we extend the log-likelihood function above so that the ‘r’ parameter 
of risk aversion is a function of the domain (‘H’), of the round of data collection, and of 
other observable individual characteristics, including income, health, gender and age: that is, 
in the log-likelihood function (4),   where r0 is a fixed 
parameter; H is the health domain variable; c is the effect associated to the health domain 
variable; T is a vector of time variables for the rounds of data collection; D is a vector of 
effects associated with each round of data collection; X is a vector of individual 
characteristics; and E is a vector of effects associated with each characteristic in the variable 
vector X. In this empirical model, therefore, the individual characteristics variables are 
allowed to affect only overall risk preferences, and not each risk domain separately.  
 
The log-likelihood function is then maximized using the Newton-Raphson optimization 
technique (for a detailed treatment on ML estimation using Stata, see (16)). We correct for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of observations within the same subject, by treating 
the residuals from the same subject as potentially correlated, and computing cluster-robust 
standard errors of estimates.  
 
As mentioned, besides the estimates obtained under the EUT assumption, we also re-
estimate the empirical model considering CRRA risk preferences within the Rank 
Dependent Utility (RDU) model by Quiggin (8). RDU is a generalization of EUT that allows 
subjects to transform the objective probabilities presented in lotteries and to use these 
weighted probabilities as decision weights in the evaluation of the lotteries. In particular, we 
consider the ‘power’ probability weighting function w(p) proposed by Quiggin (8) which is 
defined over a unique ‘curvature’ parameter y: w(p)=py. When y≠1 the RDU model deviates 
from the EUT model: concavity and convexity of w(p) are said to reflect ‘optimism’ and 
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‘pessimism’, respectively, in how a subject perceives objective probabilities. The estimation 
steps described above can be readily modified by replacing the EUT with the RDU model. 
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